The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM): A critical approach by BLANC ALTERMIR, Antonio & ORTIZ HERNÁNDEZ, Eimys
(NOUVELLE SÉRIE- VERSION ÉLECTRONIQUE)
02
2 0 1 4
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 2, janvier-décembre 2014, pp. 47-64 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_ int.2014.i2.03 47
THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UfM):
 A CRITICAL APPROACH
ANTONIO BLANC ALTEMIR
EIMYS ORTIZ HERNÁNDEZ1
I. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE UNION FOR THE MEDITARRANEAN 
– II. THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE PARIS SUMMIT: THE CONTENT OF 
THE UfM – III.- THE ASSESSMENT OF THE UfM AFTER THE FIVE YEARS 
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ABSTRACT: The seventh anniversary of the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean 
enables to have a greater perspective to examine its development. Therefore, this work provides 
some refl ections on the path followed by the Union for the Mediterranean, which has generally 
been described by the doctrine as negative. The initial project promoted by the then candidate for 
the French Republic presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy, coped with unfavourable circumstances since 
its creation, which have determined its progress. This paper analyses in a critical approach the 
development of the UfM, as well as the reasons for its stagnation, while proposing measures to 
overcome it, and achieve their full effect in the medium term.
KEYWORDS: Union for the Mediterranean; Euromediterranean Policy; Mediterranean countries; 
Mediterranean subregional approach.
L’UNION POUR LA MÉDITERRANÉE (UPM): UNE APPROCHE CRITIQUE
RÉSUMÉ: Sept ans après la création de l’Union pour la Méditerranée, et avec le  recul suffi sant 
pour étudier sa mise en œuvre, le travail ici présenté prétend  apporter plusieurs réfl exions en relation 
avec la trajectoire suivie par l’UpM, généralement considérée comme négative par la doctrine. Le 
projet initial, proposé par Nicolas Sarkozy, se heurta, dès les premiers moments à des circonstances 
défavorables qui ont infl uencé sa trajectoire postérieure. Le travail  analyse de manière constructive 
le développement de l’UpM, ainsi que les raisons de sa stagnation, tout en proposant des mesures 
pour la surmonter et atteindre une effi cacité maximum à moyen terme. 
MOT CLÉS: Union pour la Méditerranée, Politique euro-méditerranéenne ; Pays méditerranéens, 
analyse sous-régionale méditerranéenne ; aspect sous-régional méditerranéen.
LA UNIÓN POR EL MEDITERRÁNEO (UPM): UNA APROXIMACIÓN CRÍTICA
RESUMEN: Transcurridos siete años desde la creación de la Unión por el Mediterráneo, y con 
1 Dr. Antonio Blanc Altemir. Full Professor (Catedrático) of  International Law and International 
Relations. Chair Jean Monnet “Law and External Relations of  the European Union”. Director of  the 
Jean Monnet Centre of  Excellence: UdL. University of  Lleida <blanc@dpub.udl.cat>.  Miss Eimys 
Ortiz Hernández. PhD candidate sponsored by the Pre-doctoral Formation Programme DEUI, 
Basque Government. University of  Lleida <eortiz@dpub.udl.cat>. This work falls into the scope of  
the Research Project of  the Ministry of  Economy and Competitiveness “UE-Mediterráneo: impacto 
de la Primavera Árabe en las relaciones euromediterráneas y en los intereses de España en la región” 
(DER2012-38401-C02-02), whose  Leading Researcher is Antonio Blanc Altemir.
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la perspectiva sufi ciente para analizar su desarrollo, el presente trabajo pretende aportar unas 
refl exiones sobre la trayectoria seguida por la UpM, que en general ha sido califi cada de negativa 
por parte de la doctrina. El proyecto inicial promovido por el entonces candidato a la presidencia 
de la República francesa, Nicolás Sarkozy, afrontó desde sus inicios circunstancias desfavorables 
que han determinado su trayectoria. El presente artículo analiza de forma crítica el desarrollo de 
la UpM, así como las razones de su estancamiento proponiendo al mismo tiempo medidas para 
superarlo y lograr su plena efectividad a medio plazo. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Unión por el Mediterráneo; Política euromediterránea; Países mediterráneos; 
Vertiente subregional mediterránea.
I. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN
 In February 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy, at the time candidate for the French 
presidency, introduced for the fi rst time in the city of  Toulon (France) a project 
called “Mediterranean Union” which had to be modifi ed and adjusted due to the 
complex political reality and the European diplomacy.2
This initial proposal was welcomed by Spain at the time of  its launch because, 
on one hand, it recognised the leading role of  the Mediterranean for the EU, and on 
the other, meant the “return” to the Mare Nostrum with respect to the European 
interests. Nevertheless, the “sarkozynian” scheme set forward a number of  elements 
provoking uncertainty: not only the lack of  defi nition of  its content, but also the 
fact that the project unveiled a pronounced interest of  France to regain its status at 
a regional level. Thus, the project would renew the visibility of  France which had 
diminished during the foregoing years, in particular in the Maghreb as stated by 
the Avicenne report.3 Furthermore, taking into account the well-known position 
of  Sarkozy concerning the Turkish candidature to the EU, the idea emerged as an 
alternative to the accession of  Turkey. That possibility however was to be strongly 
rejected as it was displayed for the fi rst time.
Despite the fact that Spain, as booster of  the Barcelona Process, appreciated 
2 The presidential candidate Sarkozy explained in his speech that the organization of  the endeavour 
would be fl exible and adaptable like the Council of  Europe, which is why there would be a regular 
meeting of  the Heads of  State and Government: “The Mediterranean Council” would hold enough 
powers to run the four political pillars of  the project: legal migration, environment, co-development 
and cooperation regarding the fi ght against corruption, organized crime and terrorism. About the 
initial proposal the “Mediterranean Union” launched by Nicolas Sarkozy, during his presidential 
candidacy, see FLORENSA, S., “Del Proceso de Barcelona clásico a la Unión por el Mediterráneo: 
la consolidación del partenariado euromediterráneo”, in BENEYTO, J.M. (Dir.), La apuesta por el 
Mediterráneo: un reto para el siglo XXI. Biblioteca Nueva: Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos de 
la Universidad de San Pablo, Madrid, 2010, p. 59.
3 Cfr. KHADER, B., “Unión Mediterránea: ¿bonitas palabras o buena idea?”. Política Exterior, nº 122, 
Marzo/Abril 2008, pp. 65-80.
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with certain concerns the Sarkozian initiative, it was deemed to fail since it did 
not prevent the progressive marginalization or the persistent asymmetry of  the 
Mediterranean nor address the disparities existing between both shores. Side-lining 
with this point of  view, the Mediterranean Policy of  the EU did not produce the 
awaited effects notwithstanding the fi nancial efforts of  the MEDA programme, 
principally due to the lack of  a major European implication at all levels -not only 
economic but also commercial- during the years when the main aim was to absorb 
the different enlargements toward the Eastern, as well as to consolidate the single 
currency.
The Barcelona Process did need a new impetus, as some academician already 
had claimed some time before4, but it has to be acknowledged that even with these 
issues, there were also rays of  light. The new proposal absolutely ignored this factor 
grating greatest arguments in order to disassociate it from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and the EU itself  as it was only addressed to the Mediterranean 
neighbouring and assimilable States.
The proposition aroused diverse reactions and stirred many controversial debates, 
while returning the Mediterranean to a priority stage in the agendas, offering the 
opportunity to consider the validity and effectiveness of  the Mediterranean policy 
of  the EU up to that moment. Nonetheless, since the Commission was cut back 
from the project at its initial phase, the initiative was approached with some caution 
at the European level. 
Among the Member States, several reacted with prudence or evening difference. 
The country that reacted quite vehemently was Germany owing to the fragile 
issue of  fi nancing the scheme with European funding, because the project was 
non-European and disassociated from determined Member States, who were net 
taxpayers, such as Germany5. Among the Southern States, a vigilant attitude was 
taken, with the exception of  Algeria where the project was received with scepticism 
from the very beginning6.
At the beginning of  September 2007 and during a meeting of  the 16 States 
conforming the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Commissioner of  External 
4 Cfr. BLANC ALTEMIR, A., “El proceso euromediterráneo: una década de luces y sombras”. 
ADI, vol. XXI, 2005, pp. 185-225.
5 Cfr. SCHUMACHER, T., “Germany and Central and Eastern European Countries: laggards or 
veto players?”. Mediterranean Politics, vol. 16, nº 1, March, 2011, pp. 79-98.
6 Cfr. BAGHZOUZ, A., «Du processus de Barcelone à l’Union pour la Méditerranée : regards 
croisés sur les relations euro-maghrébines». L’Année du Maghreb, 2009, p. 517-536.
THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UFM): A CRITICAL APPROACH
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 2, janvier-décembre 2014, pp. 47-64 50
Relations made clear that the initiatives on the relations between the Member 
States and their neighbours had to be developed within the organisation. Likewise, 
some voices at the European Parliament and at the Commission underlined the 
contradiction implied by a project that had an undeniable inter-governmental 
character when already some fi elds of  action fell into the scope of  the common 
or coordinated work. The warning took effect owing to the fact that the French 
President Sarkozy delivered a speech in Tangier; where a change of  various signifi cant 
aspects was appreciated.
Firstly, the new proposal attempted to mend the fences regarding the previous 
one by buffering the reactions of  the Commission, Member States and the Southern 
partners. The EU was no longer “marginalised”, since the project was introduced 
as a common idea with the participation of  the European Commission, and did 
not pretend to replace the Barcelona Process or the ENP. Secondly, in order not 
to generate susceptibility among the Mediterranean partners, the project leading 
principle was the equality avoiding any reference to the controversial issue of  
migration. Lastly, the proposition set out the necessity of  “moving further and 
faster” within a pragmatic sense based upon the variable geometry, allowing the 
establishment of  the UfM as a “union of  projects”.7
The response of  the Spanish Government to the Parisian proposal had been 
constructive during all this time and worked closer with its allies in order to 
make it compatible with the acquis of  the Barcelona Process, without offending 
the encourager. A clear gesture of  this attitude occurred at the Rome Summit in 
December 20th, 2007 when the President of  the Spanish Government defended 
the validity of  mentioned process before Prodi and Sarkozy and demanded that the 
new initiative were to be placed within the framework of  the Euro-Mediterranean 
Process, which was set up in 1995 in Barcelona.
The adjustment was not only a conceptual change as it involved the arrangement 
of  the original proposal and redefi ned it within the Euro-Mediterranean framework. 
The proposed project was not original or daring; it was simply another phase of  
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.8 Three months later, the European Council 
of  13th and 14th March highlighted that the offi cial name would be “Barcelona 
7 Cfr. ESCRIBANO, G.; LORCA, A., “La Unión Mediterránea: una unión en busca de proyecto”. 
Real Instituto Elcano, DT nº 13/2008, pp. 2- 4.
8 BLANC ALTEMIR, A., “La Unión por el Mediterráneo ¿una etapa más de la política mediterránea 
de la UE?”. REDI, vol. 60, nº 2, 2008, pp. 701-705.
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Process: Union for the Mediterranean” and would include “all the Member States of  
the EU and the countries of  the Southern shore that are not member states” while 
requesting the Commission to present convenient proposals in the view of  the Paris 
Summit where the UfM was offi cially launched.9
The conclusions of  the European Council of  13th March did not leave room 
for any doubt. The political ambitions of  Sarkozy were reduced due to the fact that 
at the end it constituted another stage in the Mediterranean policy of  the EU10, 
but France still retained, as the promoter of  the project, the quality of  hosting the 
Summit of  Paris on the 13th of  July. Without a doubt, the original idea did not take 
hold because of  the strong initial opposition of  Germany and the adapted idea 
barely came through after the French-German agreement of  the 3rd of  March, 
which set the basis of  the consensus, only 10 days before the European Council. 
The Summit of  Paris, held on the 13th of  July 2008 with the attendance of  
the 43 Heads of  States and Governments of  the Euro-Mediterranean constituted 
the starting point for the UfM. The Summit was a success due to the tenacity of  
Sarkozy11, who did not want that remarkable absences could obscure the meeting, 
which happened in 2005 with the occasion of  the First Summit of  Heads of  States 
and Governments held in Barcelona where the fi rst ten years of  the launch of  the 
Euro-Mediterranean process were celebrated, making it essential to overcome the 
mistrust of  the Arab countries.
Apropos the fi nal denomination of  the initiative, one has to underline that 
the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs proposed a variation during their meeting held 
at the beginning of  November 2008 in Marseille. It was named “Union for the 
Mediterranean” instead of  “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” 
whose purpose was to highlight that it was not a process itself  but a more defi ned 
and concrete project.
9 Regarding the content of  the European Council concerning the UfM, see JAMET, J.F., “Les 
défi s politiques et économiques de l´Union pour la Méditerranée”. Questions d´Europe, nº 93, Fondation 
Robert Schuman, 25 Mars 2008.
10 Then, it respected the acquis of  the Barcelona Process and the ENP. Cfr. REITERER, M., 
“From the (French) Mediterranean Union to the (European) Barcelona Process: The Union for the 
Mediterranean part of  the European Neighbourhood Policy”. European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 14, 
2009, nº 3, pp. 313-336.  
11 Cfr. SCHMID, D., “L´Union pour la Méditerranée, coup d´essaie de la diplomatie Sarkozyenne”. 
Annuaire français de relations internationales, vol. X, 2009, pp. 139-152. GILLESPIE, R., “The Union for 
the Mediterranean: an intergovernmentalist challenge for the EU?”. Journal of  Common Market Studies, 
vol. 49, nº 6, pp. 1205-1225.
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II. THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE PARIS SUMMIT: THE CONTENT OF THE UfM
The fi nal Declaration of  the Paris Summit12 establishes that the UfM is based 
on the Barcelona Declaration and on its goal of  peace, stability and security, which 
were stated on the document. The UfM, besides, sets up a multilateral partnership 
whose aim is to increase the integration potential as well as the regional cohesion. 
The Heads of  State and Government recognised the central role of  the Barcelona 
Process in the Euro-Mediterranean relations since 1995, due to the fact that it 
represents a partnership that embraces 39 countries and more than 700 million of  
inhabitants and it constitutes the only framework where all the Euro-Mediterranean 
partners exchange different points of  view and participate in a constructive dialogue.
Although the EMP, instituted on the basis of  the well-known three pillars, still 
retains its structure and acquis, the recently developed approach is conceived as a 
progress and not a substitution. Therefore, it is observed as a renovation and an 
impulse that were very much required. The UfM will be grounded in the acquis of  the 
Barcelona Process reinforcing its achievements and positive aspects incorporating 
its objectives and fi elds of  cooperation to the three pillars, which are the main core 
of  the Euro-Mediterranean relations.
The current scheme will complete the bilateral relations that the EU has with 
its Mediterranean partners within the present frameworks, such as the association 
agreement, the action plans of  the ENP, or the case of  Mauritania, within the frame 
of  the ACP countries. The Declaration, in which there seems to be an affi rmation 
addressed to soothe Turkey for the reasons explained in previous paragraphs, 
establishes that the UfM will be dissociated from the enlargement policy of  the EU, 
accession negotiations and the pre-accession process.
As regards the member countries, the UfM involves all the Member States 
of  the EU, the European Commission as well as the other States of  the EMP, 
members and observers, even including new States which have accepted the acquis 
of  the Barcelona Process, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and 
Montenegro. The Arab League will assist as a guest on the account of  its prior status 
in the Barcelona Process.
On the subject of  its aims and the scope of  the project, the Declaration 
institutes that its main challenge will be the reinforcement of  the multilateral bonds 
12 “Déclaration commune du sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée”. Paris, 13 juillet 2008.  Available 
at <http://www.iemed.org/>.
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intensifying the political level of  the EU relations with its Euro-Mediterranean 
partners by developing a better location of  the responsibilities of  the multilateral 
relations that will be based on the co-ownership. Finally, the process will have to 
be catalysed in concrete regional and sub-regional projects that will be visible and 
tangible for the citizens.
In an attempt to concretise the fi xed goal of  the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, 
and the Working Programme adopted at the Summit of  Heads of  States and 
Governments in 2005, and in order to execute them as a regional project, the 
Declaration adds an Annex containing a series of  key initiatives (six in total) which 
the future Secretariat will have to present in a more detailed manner.
The fi rst will be the “de-pollution of  the Mediterranean” covering the coastal 
regions and the protected maritime areas, concretely, the water and waste sector. 
The “Horizon 2020” Programme will set its basis and its objective will be the 
improvement of  life conditions and survival of  the Mediterranean population. The 
second one covers “the maritime and land highways” that will develop highways of  
the sea, including the connection of  ports in the entire Mediterranean basin, but will 
also consist of  the construction of  coastal highways and the modernisation of  the 
“trans-Maghreb” railway connection. The purpose is to increase the free movement 
of  persons and goods, with as an indirect consequence will be a major integration 
of  the Mediterranean region.
The third one is “a joint civil protection” programme on natural and man-made 
disasters, especially the ones related to climate change as the Mediterranean region 
is particularly vulnerable to such disasters. The fourth “Alternative energy sources: 
a Mediterranean solar plan” will be addressed to conduct research, expansion and 
trade of  those sources of  energy because they are regarded as a fundamental priority 
in favour of  a sustainable development. 
The fi fth “higher education and research, a Euro-Mediterranean university” 
sets out the position that action will bring positive effects on the subject of  the 
understanding of  people and will favour cooperation at a higher education level 
through the foundation of  a network that will associate the universities located in 
the Mediterranean region. Moreover, higher education programmes will be created 
in order to contribute to the establishment of  a Euro-Mediterranean space of  higher 
education. Finally, “the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative” that be in 
charge of  providing support to the entities of  the Southern Mediterranean Partners 
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that assist micro-enterprises and medium and small businesses, after evaluating their 
specifi c needs, defi ning strategic solutions and supplying the necessary resources 
such as technical assistance or fi nancial instruments.
Concerning the fi nancing, the UfM will deploy additional assets principally 
through regional and sub-regional projects in the actions fi elds, which have been 
explained before, and they will emanate from the following sources: private sector; 
contributions of  the EU budget and of  all its Mediterranean partners; contributions 
of  other countries, international fi nancing institutions and regional entities; FEMIP 
or the investments from the ENP through the ENPI, among others. In any case, 
the fi nancial contributions of  the EU to the new regional projects will not diminish 
the bilateral funding amount that are already set for instance; within the ENP 
framework, the pre-accession instrument, or the European Development Fund 
(EDF) for Mauritania.
The Paris Declaration establishes that the Summit of  Heads of  States and 
Government will be bi-annual and they will be held alternately in the EU and 
in the Southern Mediterranean partners.13 Furthermore, the essential point of  
the meetings will be to conclude a political declaration that will contain a short 
list of  to-be-developed regional projects as well as a biennial working plan. The 
meeting of  the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs will take place every year, having as its 
objective to make a progress assessment14 in the consecutive conclusions adopted 
at the Summit of  Heads of  States and Government. There will be another task, 
however, being the preparation of  the next meetings of  the Summit and even the 
approval of  new projects. In addition to this, the UfM will reinforce the Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the Anna Lindh Foundation Euromed 
that will contribute to the cultural dimension of  the initiative, in cooperation with 
the Alliance of  Civilization of  the United Nations.
13 For a further analysis of  the institutional framework, vid. BLANC ALTEMIR, A., La Unión 
Europea y el Mediterráneo: de los primeros Acuerdos a la Primavera Árabe. Tecnos, Madrid, 2012, pp. 171-186.
14 In this sense one has to highlight that during the meeting of  Foreign Affairs Ministers, held in 
Marseille the 3rd and 4th November 2008, the progress was analysed regarding the selected projects 
at the Paris Summit of  13th July (ministerial joint-meetings concerning the de-pollution of  the 
Mediterranean; the creation of  the expert groups in the fi elds of  maritime and land highways, and in the 
alternative energies; the inauguration of  the Euro-Mediterranean University in Piran-Slovenia….Euro-
Mediterranean Association. 10th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of  Foreign Affairs Ministers(Marseille, 
3rd and 4th November 2008). Annex I: Declaration of  Marseille. Brussels, 14th November 2008, 
EURO-MED 2/08.
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III. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE UfM AFTER THE FIVE YEARS OF ITS 
ESTABLISHMENT (2008-2013)
The postponement of  the summit, for diverse reasons including the outbreak 
of  the turbulence in the Arab world, for the second time in six months, that should 
have hosted the leaders of  the 43 members of  the UfM in Barcelona, at the end of  
November 2010, demonstrated the gaps, challenges and critic situation of  the UfM, 
but in a more global approach also of  the Euro-Mediterranean relations themselves. 
It is noticeable that the irrefutable doses of  political voluntarism and the substantial 
diplomatic efforts, which have been taken, have not brought forward any aspiration.
In spite of  the fact that the Mediterranean have traditionally been a surrounding 
area instead of  an immediate border15, the attempts and endeavours in order to 
intensify the relations between both Mediterranean shores have never been halted 
since the sixties: the Euro-Arab dialogue from 1972 to 1995; the 5+5 Dialogue 
launched in 1990: the Barcelona Process initiated in 1995; the ENP in 2004 and 
eventually, the UfM introduced by Sarkozy in 2007 as an instrument of  internal French 
policy, whose goal was to retrieve the French prominence in the Mediterranean area, 
but set in motion offi cially in Paris in July 2008.
Posterior to the uncertainties that the French project had to overcome, 
remarkably the reluctances of  the Arab countries and of  some Member States, such 
as Germany,16 it is crucial to emphasise that the initiative has coped with three very 
diffi cult factors to overcome due to their complexity: the fi rst factor is related to 
its launch that coincided with the outbreak of  a fi nancial crisis, which has resulted 
in an economic crisis of  costly dimensions, and therefore negatively impacted the 
fi nancial contributions to the UfM not only of  the EU but also of  the foreign direct 
investment, which has been traditionally and persistently defective.
The second factor that has affected the UfM as well as the Barcelona Process 
has been the confl ict in the Middle East, whose effects have polluted the Euro-
15 Cfr. VERLUISE, P., “L´Union pour la Méditerranée: quel bilan d´étape?”. Actualités Européennes, 
nº 35, Juin 2010, p. 1. 
16 That factor would bring as a consequence the French-German compromise of  3rd March 2008, 
introduced jointly by the French President and the German Chancellor at the European Council, held 
the 13th and 14th March 2008, where the German scheme was taken into account, rejecting the French 
proposal of  limiting its scope of  action to the Mediterranean neighbouring countries. Now all the EU 
Member States and the Mediterranean non-member States were part of  the UfM, and for that reason 
even the fi rst denomination was modifi ed after the European Council, so from the Mediterranean 
Union it was adapted to “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”.
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Mediterranean relations themselves.17 In fact, on the 27th of  December 2008 and 
only a few months after the “constituent” summit of  Paris in July 2008, Israel 
launched the “Operation Cast Lead” over Gaza that lasted until the 17th of  January 
2009 provoking devastating effects not only in the Strip but also in the UfM, which 
started to stroll with a limp.18
The third factor was the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 
that led to some uncertainties concerning issues such as; how and who should hold 
the co-presidency at the EU side; the role of  the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy19, or how to integrate the European Service of  External 
Action into the initiative.
Aside from the previously mentioned factors, it is de rigueur to add the unsteady 
milieu in the Arab world as another one, so the assessment of  the fi ve years of  the 
UfM have been unsatisfactory due to the paralysis of  the project that affects not 
only itself  as such, but also, in particular, the material content of  it, even after some 
signifi cant “gestures” whose results have been insuffi cient. In fact, even in the fi rst 
year of  its establishment, July 2009, the European Commission announced an effort 
regarding the contribution to the priority projects of  the UfM20, while in May 2010, 
just before celebrating its second anniversary, the French diplomacy introduced the 
17 BICCHI, F., “The Union for the Mediterranean or the changing context of  the Euro-Mediterranean 
relations?”. Mediterranean politics, Special issue, vol. 16, nº 1, 2011, pp. 3-20.
18 As a matter of  fact, the scheduled meeting of  the brand new UfM between January and April 
2009 were cancelled, but later resumed at the level of  senior offi cials and later on at the ministerial level. 
Nevertheless, the tension remained because in November 2009, the Chief  of  the Egyptian diplomacy 
declined to encounter his Israeli counterpart, the ultranationalist Avigdor Lieberman, during a meeting 
of  Foreign Affairs Ministers in Istanbul within the framework of  the UfM. Posterior to that incident, 
the assault of  Israeli commandos to a fl otilla reaching Gaza, on the 31st of  May 2010, only a few 
days before the scheduled date for the summit -already cancelled at that time- of  Heads of  States and 
Government of  the UfM in Barcelona, just escalated the tension and as a consequence the recent 
established UfM was even more undermined.
19 JOHANSSON-NOGUÉS, E., “The UfM’s institutional structure: making inroads towards “co-
ownership”?”. Mediterranean politics, Special issue, vol. 16, nº 1, 2011, pp. 21-38.
20 The 10th July 2009, the European Commission announced an additional contribution of  72 
million euros for the term 2009-2010 with the purpose of  strengthening the development of  the 
priority projects of  the UfM, which were determined at the “constituent” summit in Paris, including 
the funding of  the Secretariat. Then, the total amount of  the UfM coming from the European 
budget was 90 million euros. Apart from the expenses of  the daily work of  the General Secretariat 
of  the UfM, the allocation of  that additional contribution was disbursed as follows: Facility for Euro-
Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP): 32 million euros; environment and de-pollution 
of  the Mediterranean: 22 million euros; maritime and land highways: 7,5 million euros; alternative 
energies-Mediterranean solar plan: 5 million euros; higher education and research- Euro-Mediterranean 
university in Slovenia: 1 million euro. Cfr. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/09/1113&format=HTML&aged==0&language=FR&guiLanguage=en>. 
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creation of  an investment fund containing 385 million euros, named Inframed, to 
fi nance those projects.21
It is perceptible that these conscious aptitudes have had a very restricted 
effect regarding the real development of  the projects until this moment, and for 
that reason, setting aside the reaction of  the EU before the Arab Spring impacted 
the scope and content of  the UfM, it has to be underlined that once again the 
calendar seemingly will not favour the future of  the initiative. As a matter of  fact, the 
tangible development of  the UfM and of  its priority projects will be subject to the 
critical economic situation of  the EU, an element that will be present in the future 
negotiations of  the fi nancial perspective for the term of  2014-2020.22
The funding of  the UfM constitutes a non-solved issue up to this very moment, 
principally due to the economic and fi nancial crisis in Europe. In fact, the Paris 
Declaration pointed out that the added value of  the UfM lies in “its capacity to 
attract more fi nancial resources for regional projects, with a high degree of  donor 
coordination”23. That document mentioned possible donors from the private sector24, 
a budgetary raise of  the EU; the participation of  the Member States and even other 
countries and international fi nancial institutions and the ENPI and FEMIP.25
21 Determined to boost the specifi c projects in the Mediterranean region concerning the priority 
sectors established in the Paris Declaration, in particular in the fi eld of  transport and energy, the 
French diplomacy announced the creation of  Inframed on the 26th of  May 2010, an investment fund 
amounting to 385 million euros aiming to fi nance the projects of  the UfM. The Fund would allow 
raising private capital in order to fi nance projects in the 43 member States of  the UfM. The participants 
were the French Caisse des dépôts (150 million euros); the Italian Cassa Depositi (150 million euros); 
the Caisse des dépôts et de gestion du Maroc (20 million euros); the Egyptian EFG Hermes (15 
million euros) and the European Investment Bank (50 million euros). Cfr. Available at: <http://www.
diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/europe_828/union-europeenne-monde_13399/relations-exterieures_853/
union-pour-mediterranee_17975/upm-lancement-du-fonds-investissement-inframed-26.05.10_82596.
html>.
22 The budget allocation proposed by the Commission for the term 2014-2020 assigns a total of  
70.000 million euros for the Chapter of  External Action, that at the same time allots 16.100 to the 
ENPI and 1.400 to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. Cfr. European 
Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions. A budget for Europe 
2020. Part II: Index on Policies. COM (2011) 500 fi nal Part II. Brussels, 29-6-2011, p. 50. 
23 Sommet de l´Union pour la Méditerranée. Déclaration commune (Paris, 13 juillet 2008), loc. cit., 
p. 12.
24 The estimation, quite optimistically, of  the French President Sarkozy, reached 14.000 million euros 
coming from the private sector. BIRAMBAUX, I., The Union for the Mediterranean: Beyond the Barcelona 
Process?. OPEX, Madrid, 2008, p. 1.
25 Sommet de l´Union pour la Méditerranée. Déclaration commune (Paris, 13 juillet 2008), doc. cit., 
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Taking into account these diverse sources and in particular the importance 
awarded to the private sector, it is appropriate to highlight the increased pessimism 
in the North and the South respectively over the funding, due specifi cally to the high 
cost of  the projects, to the limits of  the European budget and to the complexity of  
the management of  the public and private resources, without omitting the economic 
crisis.26
Expecting that the economic crisis does not harm defi nitely the viability of  the 
UfM, it is necessary to assert the funding -through the coordination between public 
and private funding- of  the projects, which are considered of  fi rst importance and 
provide an added value at the regional and local level. It is evident that this requires 
a political compromise of  the countries members of  the UfM, which should be 
reached in future summit of  Heads of  States and Governments, postponed sine die 
since November 2010.
In the event that the project of  the UfM aspired to be “alive”, it seems inevitable 
a reinforcement of  the Southern periphery of  the ENP as well as an increase in 
the contributions of  the member States and the EU to the projects of  the UfM 
within the framework of  the new fi nancial perspective 2014-2020. Furthermore, 
it have to be widened the involvement of  the national fi nancial institutions; the 
European ones, such as the EIB27, the FEMIP, or the EBRD; and the international 
ones also for instance the World Bank, because they already operate in the region. 
The essential coordination among the diverse sources of  fi nancing constitute a 
challenge, not yet solved, that manifests its defi cit when dealing with the signifi cant 
projects, whose viability would be noticeably expanded with the foundation of  the 
Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Development Bank.
The creation of  investment funds for fi nancing the UfM projects, like the 
previously mentioned Inframed concerning the investment of  infrastructure, 
constituted a very valid initiative that should be strengthened in the future, especially 
those intended for fi nancing projects of  local and regional entities connected to the 
sustainable development. It is noticeable that would demand a clear improvement 
p. 12.
26 Cfr. BARBÉ IZUEL, E., “La Unión por el Mediterráneo: de la europeización de la política 
exterior a la descomunitarización de la política mediterránea”. Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, nº 
32, enero/abril,2009, p. 37.
27 It has to be emphasized that the EIB coordinates three out of  the six priority projects of  the UfM: 
de-pollution of  the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Maritime and land highways.
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of  the economic and legal sphere of  the Mediterranean partners, whose immediately 
consequence would be the pull of  foreign investment in the region because there 
would be the protection of  investors.28
Another additional issue, which the UfM has been facing, has been its own 
defi nition and the implementation of  its institutional and operational architecture, 
which has affected remarkably the General Secretariat. The late approval of  the 
statutes and in particular of  its budget -very limited- had an impact on its effectiveness 
and independency in a moment that was crucial for getting the project started. A 
posteriori, the paralysis of  the UfM owing to the new manifestation of  the eternal 
Arab-Israeli confl ict, especially during the intervention in Gaza; and later on due to 
the outbreak of  the Arab Spring, which coincided in time with the resignation of  the 
fi rst General Secretary, have reinforced the lack of  visibility that it never had indeed.
It took six months -until the beginning of  2011- to appoint a replacement, 
the Moroccan Youssef  Amrani, which demonstrated the persistent diffi culties to 
fi nd a viable candidate for the Secretariat, even when the processes of  transition 
in the Arab World entailed a visible head at the General Secretariat of  the UfM. 
Nevertheless, it seems that position lacks of  “luck” because Youssef  Amrani left 
after a year -January 2012- coming back to the Moroccan Cabinet as Delegate-
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Therefore, it was appointed a new 
General Secretary in March 2012, the Moroccan diplomat Fathallah Sijilmasi. When 
assuming his position, he declared that his commitment to “deliver tangible results 
in the near future”.29
Furthermore, it is comme il faut to encourage cooperation between the Secretariat 
and the European Commission, as well as to clearly determine their respective 
competences, and then to achieve a greater implication of  the Commission in the 
activities of  the UfM. Moreover, it is also needed to defi ne with clarity its institutional 
structure, because that would result in positive effects regarding the visibility of  the 
UfM and the diffusion of  its activities and projects.
28 To that end it would be appropriate to set up a system of  insurances and fi nancial guarantees for 
the investors, inspired in the system of  the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, but adapted to 
the concrete context of  the Euro-Mediterranean region.
29 His words are available at: <http://ufmsecretariat.org/mr-fathallah-sijilmassi-takes-offi ce-at-
the-union-for-the-mediterranean/>.
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Underlining this aspect, some relevant projects have been launched within the six 
areas of  priority.30 For instance, the creation of  the Euro-Mediterranean University 
of  Fes, or the project regarding the development of  women empowerment, or the 
project of  the “Jordanian railway network”.31These and other initiatives resume the 
“active” work of  the UfM, however, the society is not aware of  these progresses. 
There is a “lost in transmitting” what the UfM does.
As regards the co-presidency, and apart from the defi nitive formula to appoint 
the co-president at the EU level, everything seems to indicate that there would some 
strains to designate by consensus the co-president at the South level due to the 
heterogeneity of  the three existing groups: Arab countries, Turkey and Israel plus 
European non-Members States. The consensus reached when appointing the fi rst 
co-presidents, Sarkozy and Mubarak, as the promoters of  the UfM, could take some 
time to be achieved.
It is also convenient to underline that the experience of  these fi ve years has 
corroborated that the role of  the co-presidency has been of  minor importance 
before the confl ict in the Mediterranean region, such as the case of  the Gaza 
war. Doubtlessly, this is one of  the issues that should be improved, so then a co-
presidency with a major political infl uence before critical situations like the previously 
mentioned. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into consideration the limitations of  this 
proposal, specifi cally concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Actually, the fact that the actions of  the co-presidency, concretely the release of  
statements and documents regarding a specifi c situation, have to be agreed between 
both co-president constrain enormously the scope of  them due to the level of  
protection  and respect of  the human rights and fundamental rights in the Southern 
countries. However, the evolution of  the democratic processes, which were initiated 
at the beginning of  2011 in Egypt and in some Arab countries, can change the 
equation.
On the subject of  the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, it has 
enhanced its role as an element of  the institutional architecture of  the UfM, and 
the reason behind is that the Assembly is a component of  the project and it has the 
30 The six areas of  priority: business development; transport and urban development; energy; 
environment and water; higher education and research, and social and civil affairs.
31 Available at <http://ufmsecretariat.org/projects/>.
ANTONIO BLANC ALTEMIR
EIMYS ORTIZ HERNÁNDEZ
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 2, janvier-décembre 2014, pp. 47-64 61
purpose to become the democracy guarantor.32 Following this position, the European 
Parliament has requested the assumption of  higher responsibilities through an 
instrument of  consultation and democratic control in connection with the defi nition 
of  the principal strategies of  action, the regular assessment of  the proposals, the 
execution of  the budget, and even the creation of  mechanisms that could enable the 
periodic appearance of  the General Secretary and his Deputy General Secretaries 
before specifi c commissions. Defi nitely, that has to go with the improvement of  the 
functioning and the working methods of  the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly, including the supply of  the necessary fi nancial and human resources, as 
well as a better coordination of  the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly 
with the others UfM institutions33, while covering joint-meetings with the recent 
established Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM).34
The limitations and defi ciencies of  the UfM, materialized in these fi ve years 
after its establishment, go forward the before mentioned issues such as the fi nancing 
and institutional framework. In fact, the initial French project of  the Mediterranean 
Union avoided any reference to the democracy and human rights affairs, a matter 
that was already covered by the Barcelona Declaration.
Aside from the objection that the formal inclusion in the Barcelona Process 
of  these subjects did not help to denounce the fl agrant violations of  human rights 
and fundamental freedoms that happened in the Southern partners, it is certain 
that the lack of  reference in the UfM documents made it much more relevant 
and central because they constitute European and universal values.35 The fact that 
the pragmatism character of  the UfM as well as its technocratic and economist 
feature has ignored central issues of  the Euro-Mediterranean acquis36, for instance 
democracy and human rights, has provoked some negative reaction in sectors of  the 
civil society which is committed to traditional values of  the EU.
Another matter, which is not set forth in the Paris Declaration, is the lack of  
32 In this sense, it has to be highlighted that at the sixth plenary session of  the Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly, held in Amman during the 13th and 14th March 2010, was proposed to 
renamed it as the Parliamentary Assembly-Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UfM).
33 Union for the Mediterranean European Parliament resolution of  20 May 2010 on the Union for 
the Mediterranean (2009/2215 (INI)), OJ C 161E, 31st May 2011.
34 Ibid. par. 40.
35 The only exception is a very general reference in the introductory section of  the constituent 
documents (Declaration of  Paris and Marseille). The mention to the democratic values and human 
rights are absent in the main core of  both documents.
36 Vid. In that sense BARBÉ IZUEL, E., “La Unión por el Mediterráneo…”, loc. cit., p. 46.
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reference to socio-economic, trade or energy matters, some of  them like the direct 
foreign investment, employment, reduction of  poverty and energetic effi ciency 
constituted one of  the central structural problems in the Mediterranean, particularly 
in the Southern37. It has to be emphasized also the lack of  a more signifi cant reference 
-more than the repetitive formula of  promoting legal migration and the fi ght against 
the illegal one- in the UfM documents. It is evident that the construction of  the UfM 
cannot be disassociated of  that fundamental matter, moreover, it cannot ignored 
the importance of  the regulation of  the migratory fl ows, and it should implement 
progressively the free movement between both shoes and the integration of  migrants.
It cannot be disregarded the signifi cance of  encouraging sectors concerning 
education, research, university exchanges and cultural because they can favour 
mutual understanding among civil societies. Therefore, it should be adopted a 
Euro-Mediterranean strategy addressed to enhance inter-cultural and inter-religious 
dialogue and within the framework of  the UfM, it should be incorporated new 
projects in these fi elds.
The fact that the eternal Arab-Israeli confl ict has “kidnapped” during these 
years the project of  the UfM, as it happened with the Barcelona process too, has 
pointed out, that even with the limited and discreet capacity of  the EU in solving 
the confl ict, the destabilising potential of  it over the Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
Taking into account that the UfM is not the forum to negotiate the peace, it cannot 
be ignored that it is the only framework where all its parts come together -apart from 
the United Nations auspices- ergo it could be opportune to take advantage of  that 
instrument.
Although this and other regional confl icts placed in the Mediterranean cannot 
paralyse the sectorial and multilateral cooperation, it is obvious that the UfM will be 
unable to consolidate itself  due to the lack of  mutual trust of  the parties.
Finally, it has to be underlined that the processes of  reforms and modernisation 
happening in the Southern shore of  the Mediterranean will have to inevitably 
promote regional integration process where the UfM could play a central role. The 
fact that the exchanges South-South represent around 6%-8% during the last years 
means an impediment of  the interests of  the Southern Mediterranean partners 
themselves.
Despite the current confl icts and the ultraconservative nationalism have 
37 Nevertheless, the Marseille Declaration contained a reference to some of  these sectors, such as 
energy of  the creation of  a free trade area, within the section III: Work programme for 2009.
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endangered any progress, the economic and political cost of  the non-integration is 
higher for the population of  those countries, that is why it cannot be dismissed that 
after the Arab Spring, there will be some forward movement.38Taking into account 
the UfM allows the reinforcement of  the regional and multilateral dimension of  
the Euro-Mediterranean relations, which could constitute a much appropriated 
framework for promoting the sub-regional integration, however, it has to be 
highlighted that this issue has not yet emerged.
The regional integration and democracy should go hand-in-hand in this process 
as it happened in Europe at the beginning of  the fi fties. The Southern Mediterranean 
countries need the Jean Monnet vision in order to foster the sub-regional integration 
as well as their co-development. Perhaps, the deep reshaping events taking place 
on the Southern shore could divert into a more integrated process that allowing 
the current disagreements to be overcome and to reconsider the future in a more 
positive perspective.
In any case, the outbreak of  the Arab Spring should be regarded as a great 
opportunity to re-launch the Euro-Mediterranean relations, with the UfM being the 
ideal regional framework to promote the democratisation of  the area. Therefore, 
it would be convenient to introduce within the forum of  the UfM a programme 
concerning the political, economic and social transition of  the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
At fi rst sight, the UfM seems another failure of  the Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. Its setbacks, however, can be adapted to its main breakthroughs. Taking 
this affi rmation into account, it should fi rstly be mentioned that its foundation 
already suffered from a lack of  success but that its main result was placement 
of  the Mediterranean on the EU’s priorities agenda. Secondly, one has to bear in 
mind that its defi nition as a “union of  projects” refers to a pure pragmatism where 
the protection of  human rights and fundamental freedoms are allocated to other 
appropriate frameworks.
Thirdly, the interaction with the EMP and ENP has consistently been pointed 
38 An example that illustrates that situation of  the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is its own blockage 
due to some controversies between its principal members: Morocco and Algeria. In spite of  that, the 
fact that Algeria did not veto the recent appointment of  the new General Secretary of  the UfM, the 
Moroccan diplomat Youssef  Amrani, could be interpret as a sign of  a possible progress in the Maghreb. 
THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UFM): A CRITICAL APPROACH
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 2, janvier-décembre 2014, pp. 47-64 64
out as a diffi culty, whereas the UfM is an extra value to the general framework as 
the sub-regional cooperation level will be reinforced through the area of  priorities. 
Fourthly, the institutional scheme has been broadly criticized, in particular due to the 
absence of  political input to appoint the General Secretary or to overcome the co-
presidency issue at both shores. Nonetheless, the existence of  such a treaded path in 
the search for consensus, even during diffi cult situations, means that the institutional 
framework could be revitalized in the future if  the political will is present.
Fifthly, the economic crisis has been perceived as a limitation while it, nevertheless, 
could be an opportunity to maximize resources when launching tangible and factual 
projects. Last but not least, the insuffi cient visibility may be solved by strengthening 
the role of  the General Secretary as some sort of  “Mister Euro-Mediterranean”, 
linking the North and the South.
In conclusion, the UfM was heading for failure since its very beginning but 
did represent the third path in the Euro-Mediterranean policy, where the project-
driven sub-regional cooperation was tackled as the main purpose establishing that 
it can play a very relevant role in supporting the Mediterranean partners during the 
political transitions in this new phase.
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